Abstract. Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies.
INTRODUCTION
In transportation and other kinds of networks, congestion externalities are a potential source of inefficiency. A remarkable example of this, known as Braess's paradox (see, e.g., Nagurney, 1999) , is shown in Figure 1 . Cars arrive at a constant rate at vertex o of the depicted network and leave it at vertex d. The network consists of three fast roads (e 1 , e 4 , and e 5 ) and two slow detours (e 2 and e 3 ). The travel time on each road is an increasing function of the flow through it, or the average number of vehicles passing a fixed point in the road per unit of time. (This is a reasonable assumption if the density of vehicles on the road is relatively low, so that the flow is well below the road's capacity. See Sheffi, 1985, Chapter 13, and Figure 1.8.) However, regardless of the flow, the travel time on the route consisting of the three fast roads is shorter than on any of the alternative routes. Therefore, at equilibrium, all vehicles use that route.
The travel time on the network is then 21 minutes. Suppose, however, that the transverse road, e 5 , is closed, or its condition declines so that the travel time on it becomes similar to the travel time on each of the two detours. The new cost curve is higher than the old one: the travel time corresponding to every flow through e 5 is longer than before. As a result of the change in costs, the old equilibrium is replaced by a new one, in which the transverse road is not used: half the vehicles go through the left route (e 1 and e 3 ), and half through the right route (e 2 and e 4 ). Paradoxically, the new travel time is shorter than before, 20 minutes. The reason for this is that the motorists' choice of routes is only guided by concern for their own good; it does not take others' welfare into consideration. This selfish attitude results in an overuse of the network has an embedded Wheatstone network. In networks without this property, so-called series-parallel networks, Braess's paradox cannot occur. Several alternative characterizations of series-parallel networks are given below. in minutes, are 1 + 6x for e 1 and e 4 , and 15 + 2x for e 2 and e 3 . If the travel time on e 5 is also given by 1 + 6x, then, at equilibrium, the entire flow from o to d passes through that edge. The total travel time from o to d is then 21 minutes. If, however, the travel time on e 5 is longer, and given by 15 + 2x, then there is no flow through that edge.
The equilibrium travel time is then shorter, 20 minutes.
The emphasis in this paper is on network topologies for which some cost functions giving rise to inefficiencies exist. Other papers, in contrast, put the emphasis on the cost functions themselves. For example, Steinberg and Zangwill (1983) and Dafermos and Nagurney (1984) derive formulas yielding, under certain conditions, the change in users' costs induced by the creation of additional routes. These formulas can, in principle, be used to determine whether a form of the Braess's paradox occurs in the network. They are, however, rather complicated. Calvert and Keady (1993) consider the total power loss in a network in which the potential drop across the two endpoints of each edge is an increasing function of the quantity obtained by dividing the edge flow by some edge-specific conductivity factor. They show that if the functional relation between this quantity and the potential drop is given by a power function, which is the same for all edges, then, when one or more of the conductivity factors is increased, with the total flow through the network kept constant, the total power loss either decreases or remains the same. Conversely, if the functions are not all equal to some power function, and there are at least six edges, it is possible to arrange the edges so that if one of the conductivity factors is increased, the total power loss also increases. Thus, a version of Braess's paradox occurs in the network. Calvert and Keady (1993) also give a topological result (Theorem 11), which says that, in a seriesparallel network, this phenomenon cannot occur. In such a network, the total power loss can only decrease or remain the same when any of the conductivity factors increases.
Braess's paradox is not the only kind of inefficiency caused by congestion externalities. Consider, for example, the series-parallel network in Figure 2 Sunday. The South Beach is more remote, and so the cost of getting there is 2 units greater than for the North Beach. On the other hand, it is a longer beach, and therefore does not get crowded as fast. However, the additional pleasure of spending the day on an uncrowded beach never exceeds the difference in travel costs. Therefore, at equilibrium all the visitors go to the North Beach, both on Saturday and on Sunday.
The crowding there then reduces each person's pleasure by 4 units. However, if people were taking turns in going to the South Beach, half of them going there on Saturday and the other half on Sunday, then the cost for all individuals would be lower, 3.5. Thus, this assignment represents a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium. The difference between this example and the one above is that, in the case of the Braess's paradox, Pareto improvement results from increasing the costs of 5 certain facilities (e.g., increasing the travel time on the transverse road in Figure 1 ), thereby creating a new equilibrium that is better for everyone. In contrast, in the present example it is not possible to make everybody better off simply by increasing the costs (e.g., charging congestion-dependent entry fees to beaches). Since the networks in Figure 2 are series-parallel, Braess's paradox cannot occur, and therefore any Pareto improvement must involve non-equilibrium behavior. from o to d passing through the edge. For e 1 and e 3 , the cost is given by 2x. For e 2 and e 4 , it is 2 + x. At equilibrium, only e 1 and e 3 are used, and the equilibrium cost is 4.
However, this outcome is inefficient. Splitting the flow, so that half of it goes through e 1 and e 4 and half through e 2 and e 3 , would reduce the cost to 3.5. A similar phenomenon occurs in network (b). Indeed, since all the routes from o to d pass through the middle edge e 5 , the cost of this edge is immaterial.
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The main result of this paper is that the three graphs in Figures 1 and 2 essentially represent the only kinds of network topologies in which inefficient equilibria are possible. For example, inefficiencies never arise in a network like that in Figure 3 .
The crucial difference between this and the other networks mentioned above is that routes in this network are independent in the sense that each route contains at least one edge that is not part of any other route. The first paper to show a connection between the independence of the routes in a network (or, rather, a property equivalent to it) and the efficiency of the equilibria is Holzman and Law-Yone (1997) . This paper considers, in fact, a larger class of strategy spaces, of which routes in networks constitute a sub-class. An explicit treatment of transportation networks can be found in Law-Yone (1995) . For networks, the main result of Holzman and Law-Yone (1997) can be stated as follows: If the network has independent routes, then for every cost function all equilibria are weakly Pareto efficient and, moreover, are strong in the sense that no group of users can make all its members better off by changing their choices of routes. Conversely, if routes are not independent, then there is a cost function for which none of the equilibria is even weakly Pareto efficient. The main difference between Holzman and Law-Yone (1997) and the present paper is that these authors consider games with a finite number of players, each of whom has a nonnegligible effect on the others. The present paper, in contrast, assumes there is a continuum of users. This may be viewed as a mathematical idealization of a very large population of individuals, each with a nearly negligible effect on the others. There are several substantial differences between these two cases. One of them is that, in the latter but not in the former case, the connection between the independence of the routes and the efficiency of the equilibria also holds for heterogeneous populations, in which not all users have the same cost function.
Users may differ in the innate quality they assign to the various alternatives, or in the degree by which they are affected by congestion. For example, some motorists may be concerned primarily with the travel time, and others with the distance traveled. In small populations, heterogeneity is a potential source of inefficiency. This can be demonstrated by the simple two-user, two-facility example in which each user has a different favorite facility, but would rather not use it than share it with the other user (see Milchtaich, 1996) . In this example, there are two (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria, one of which is worse for both users. In contrast, if there is a continuum of users, then one Nash equilibrium may strictly Pareto dominate another only if one of 7 the networks in Figures 1 and 2 is embedded in the network. In a network that does not have this property, i.e., one with independent routes, all Nash equilibria are efficient-for heterogeneous as well as homogeneous populations.
An intermediate model between that of a finite population of users and that of a continuum of users is the one in which flow is continuous but the population of users is finite (see, for example, Orda et al., 1993) . Each user controls a fixed portion of the flow and distributes it so as to minimize the user's total cost. While the results of the present paper are not directly applicable, it is likely that connections similar to those established here between network topology and the efficiency of the equilibria also hold for this model. Yet another line of investigation concerns the social optimality of the equilibria, i.e., whether, at equilibrium, the total cost is minimized-a condition more demanding than Pareto efficiency. This may not be answered by only considering the network topology; it is also necessary to know the functional form of the cost functions. For networks that consist of several edges connected in parallel, conditions for social optimality of the equilibria are established in Milchtaich (2001) . 
Two-terminal networks
A two-terminal network (network, for short) is an undirected multigraph together with a distinguished ordered pair of distinct vertices, o (for "origin") and d (for "destination"), such that each vertex and each edge belong to at least one walk in which the initial vertex is o, the terminal vertex is d, and all the vertices are distinct.
Any walk with these properties will be called a route. The set of all routes in a network is denoted R.
Two networks G and G' will be said to be isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence between their vertices and between their edges such that (i) the incidence relation is preserved and (ii) the origin and destination in G are paired with the origin and destination in G', respectively. A network G is embedded in a network G' if G' is isomorphic to a network obtained from G by carrying out any number of times one or more of the following operations (see Figure 4 ):
1. Subdividing an edge; i.e., replacing it with two edges with a single common end vertex.
2. Adding an edge that joins two existing vertices.
3. "Extending" the origin or the destination; i.e., adding an edge joining o or d and another, new vertex, which becomes the new origin or destination, respectively. Two networks G' and G" with the same origin-destination pair, but no other common vertices or edges, may be connected in parallel. The set of vertices in the resulting network G is the union of the sets of vertices in G' and G", and similarly for the set of edges. The origin and destination in G are the same as in G' and G". Two networks G' and G" with a single common vertex (and, hence, without common edges), which is the destination in G' and the origin in G", may be connected in series.
The set of vertices in the resulting network G is the union of the sets of vertices in G'
and G", and similarly for the set of edges. The origin in G coincides with the origin in G', and the destination is the destination in G".
A network is said to be series-parallel if no two routes pass through any edge in opposite directions. The two networks in Figure 2 are series-parallel. The Wheatstone network in Figure 1 is not series-parallel, since there are two routes passing through e 5 in opposite directions. In fact, as the following proposition shows, the Wheatstone network is part of any series-parallel network. This result is very similar to one of Duffin (1965, Theorem 1) . Figure 1 is not embedded in it.
Proposition 1. A network G is series-parallel if and only if the network in
As noted by Riordan and Shannon (1942) , series-parallel networks can also be defined recursively: A network is series-parallel if and only if it can be constructed from single edges by carrying out any number of times the operations of connecting networks in series or in parallel. Hence the term "series-parallel." The following proposition establishes this.
Proposition 2. A network G is series-parallel if and only if (i)
it has a single edge only; or
(ii) it is the result of connecting two series-parallel networks in parallel; or (iii) it is the result of connecting two series-parallel networks in series.
One corollary of Proposition 2 is that every series-parallel network is planar and, moreover, remains so when a new edge, joining o and d, is added to it. Equivalently, every series-parallel network can be embedded in the plane in such a way that o and d lie on the exterior face, or boundary. Using Proposition 2, this result can easily be proved by induction on the number of edges. A practical way of verifying that a given network is series-parallel is suggested by the third condition in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For every network G, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(ii) For every pair of distinct vertices u and v, if u precedes v in some route r containing both vertices, then u precedes v in all such routes.
(iii) The vertices can be indexed in such a way that, along each route, they have increasing indices.
A network with independent routes is one in which every route contains at least one edge that does not belong to any other route. An example of a network with independent routes is shown in Figure 3 . As shown below, such a network is necessarily series-parallel. The converse, however, is false. For example, the two networks in Figure 2 are series-parallel but the routes in them are not independent. In fact, it follows from the next proposition that these are essentially the only such networks.
Proposition 4. A network G is a network with independent routes if and only if none of the networks in Figures 1 and 2 is embedded in it.
The result that every network with independent routes is series-parallel follows as an immediate corollary from Propositions 1 and 4. It can also be deduced from the following recursive characterization of such networks, due to Law-Yone (1995) . This characterization differs from the one for series-parallel networks (Proposition 2) only in condition (iii), which is stronger than the corresponding condition there.
Proposition 5. A network G is a network with independent routes if and only if (i)
(ii) it is the result of connecting in parallel two networks with independent routes; or (iii) it is the result of connecting in series a network with independent routes and a network with a single edge.
In every network, each route r has a unique set of edges, and may therefore be identified with a unique binary vector, coordinate e of which is 1 if edge e belongs to r and 0 otherwise. This vector can be viewed as an element of the vector space
where |E| is the number of edges in the network and Z 2 is the field of the integers modulo 2. A set of routes will be said to be independent if the corresponding set of vectors is linearly independent in Z |E| 2 . Equivalently, a set of routes is independent if it is not possible to write one of the corresponding vectors as the (component-wise) sum modulo 2 of some of the others. As the following proposition shows, a network with independent routes is characterized by the property that the set of all routes is independent. 1 Hence the term. An equivalent property is that the set of all routes does not contain a "bad configuration" (Holzman and Law-Yone, 1997) . A bad configuration is a triplet of routes such that the first route contains some edge e 1 that does not belong to the second route, the second route contains some edge e 2 that does not belong to the first route, and the third route contains both e 1 and e 2 . Another property that characterizes networks with independent routes is that pairs of routes never merge only in their middle; in other words, any common section must extend either to o or to d.
Proposition 6. For every network G, the following four conditions are equivalent:
The set R of all routes in G is independent.
(ii) A triplet of routes constituting a bad configuration does not exist.
(iii) For every pair of distinct routes r and s and every vertex v common to both routes, either the section r ov (which consists of v and all the vertices and edges preceding it in r) is equal to s ov , or r vd is equal to s vd .
(iv) G is a network with independent routes. 13
FLOWS AND COSTS
A flow in a network is a specification of a nonnegative route flow f r for each route r.
It can be written in a form of a flow vector f, coordinate r of which is f r . Given the flow vector, the flow f s through any walk s is defined as the total flow in all the routes of which s is a section:
If s is a walk of length zero, consisting of a single vertex, then f s represents the total flow in all the routes passing through that vertex. In particular, the flow through the origin,
represents the total origin-destination flow. It is equal, of course, to f d , the flow through the destination. If s is a walk of length one, consisting of a single edge and its two end vertices, then f s represents the total flow through that edge in a the direction indicated by s; it will be referred to as an edge flow. Note that each edge is associated with a pair of edge flows, one in each direction. However, in a series-parallel network, in which all routes pass through an edge in the same direction, only one of these can ever be positive. In a network with independent routes, the edge flows uniquely determine the flow vector.
It should be emphasized that, in this paper, flow is always assumed to originate in a In a series-parallel network, where all routes pass through an edge in the same direction, the cost of passing through it in the opposite direction, as well as the effect on the cost of the flow in the opposite direction, are immaterial.
In models of transportation networks, the assumption that the cost function is additively separable is customary. Moreover, it is often assumed that there is only one direction in which each edge can be passed through (e.g., Sheffi, 1985; Bell and Iida, 1997) . Thus, a two-way highway is described by a pair of edges. Correspondingly, the description of a transportation network typically involves two kinds of data: a directed graph, which describes both the physical network and the directions in which individual edges may be traveled on; and a system of associated edge cost functions, which give the travel time on each edge as a function of the edge flow. However, the model presented in Beckmann et al. (1956) differs in that it assumes all roads to be two-way. Moreover, the cost of traveling on a road in both directions is assumed equal, and is only a function of the sum of the flows in all routes passing through the road in either direction. The model presented in the present paper subsumes both these models. In the additively separable case, each edge is associated with a pair of cost functions-one in each direction. The first transportation model described above corresponds to a case in which the cost of passing through an edge in a particular direction is prohibitively high. The second model corresponds to a case in which the two costs are equal, and only depend on the sum of the edge flows in both directions.
Dropping the additive separability assumption gains the model some generality. For example, turning restrictions can be incorporated simply by assigning very high (or infinite) costs to certain routes. The same applies to the possibility that route costs are affected by the flow through one or more of their vertices. Such flows may, for example, represent a crude measure of congestion at four-way stop junctions.
However, neither the possibility of non-separable costs nor that of junction costs is essential for any of the results below.
EQUILIBRIUM
A flow vector f* is said to be an equilibrium if the entire flow from o to d passes through least cost routes. Mathematically, the equilibrium condition is:
(2) For every route r with f r * > 0,
In this case, the above minimum, denoted c*, is the equilibrium cost. In the transportation literature, a flow vector satisfying (2) is known as a Wardrop, or user, equilibrium. This condition expresses the principle, formulated by Wardrop and others (see references in Nagurney, 1999, p. 151) , that, at equilibrium, the travel time on all used routes is equal, and less than or equal to the travel time that would be experienced by of a single vehicle on any unused route (Sheffi, 1985) .
The equilibrium condition (2) can also be given a variational inequality formulation, as follows (see Nagurney, 1999 , Theorem 4.5):
For every flow vector f with the same total origin-destination flow as f*,
Standard results (e.g., Nagurney, 1999, Theorem 1.4) then imply that, if the cost function is continuous, then for every δ ≥ 0 there exists an equilibrium with a total origin-destination flow of δ. In general, there can be more than one such equilibrium.
However, as the following proposition shows, if the network is series-parallel and the cost function is additively separable, then the total origin-destination flow uniquely determines the equilibrium cost. Moreover, in such a setting, increasing the edge costs or the total origin-destination flow cannot result in a decreasing equilibrium cost. The result that, in a series-parallel network with an additively separable cost function, the equilibrium cost cannot decrease when edge costs increase, holds in the case of elastic as well as inelastic demand. In the latter case, in any equilibrium the total origin-destination flow must equal the fixed demand δ. Therefore, this result follows directly from Proposition 7. In the former case, the demand is determined as a nonincreasing function of the cost (Sheffi, 1985, p. 135; Bell and Iida, 1997, p. 102) .
That is, the total origin-destination flow may vary, but is lower in one equilibrium than in another only if the first equilibrium cost is higher than the second. In particular, for ĉ and c as in Proposition 7 and for any pair of corresponding equilibria f ˆ and f ˜, if f ˆo < f ˜o then ĉ ≥ c. On the other hand, by Proposition 7, f ˆo ≥ f ˜o also implies ĉ ≥ c. Therefore, the last inequality holds unconditionally. This proves that, in the case of elastic as well as inelastic demand, a unique equilibrium cost corresponds to any additively separable cost function, and this cost either increases or remains the same when edge costs are increased.
The case of elastic demand is, in fact, not that much different from the case of fixed, inelastic demand. This can be shown by making the option of "staying at home" explicit. This option, which carries a fixed cost, is optimal if and only its cost is less than that of any route in the network. Therefore, the option of "staying at home" can be represented by a single edge, joining o and d, with a flow-independent cost. By
Propositions 2 and 5, adding such an edge to a series-parallel network or one with independent routes does not affect the respective property. Also, if the cost function in the original network is additively separable, then the same is true for the enlarged one.
These considerations show that, for certain purposes at least, demand may be assumed inelastic. Correspondingly, it suffices to restrict attention to flow vectors with a total origin-destination flow equal to the fixed demand.
EFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA
Braess's paradox represents an extreme form of inefficiency. It occurs in a network G if there are two additively separable cost functions ĉ and c such that ĉ r (f) ≥ c r (f) for all routes r and flow vectors f, but for every equilibrium f ˆ with respect to ĉ with a total origin-destination flow of unity 4 and every equilibrium f ˜ with respect to c with a similar total origin-destination flow, the respective equilibrium costs ĉ and c satisfy ĉ < c. Thus, Braess's paradox occurs when higher cost curves potentially correspond to a lower equilibrium cost. As the following theorem shows, this is the case for every network that is not series-parallel. Conversely, for a network that is series-parallel, a pair of cost functions as above never exists. This result immediately implies Theorem 11 of Calvert and Keady (1993) (for the case of two-terminal networks), which is described in the Introduction.
Theorem 1. For every network G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Braess's paradox occurs in G.
(ii) G is not series-parallel.
Even though series-parallel networks never exhibit Braess's paradox, they do not always have efficient equilibria. This is demonstrated by the example in Figure 2 , in which the equilibrium flow can be rearranged in such a way that the costs of all routes actually used become less than the equilibrium cost. As the next theorem shows, the reason this kind of inefficiency occurs in the networks in Figure 2 is that routes in these networks are not independent.
An equilibrium f*, with equilibrium cost c*, will be said to be weakly origin-destination flow of unity. This flow vector will be denoted by f(σ). A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if, for every user i,
In this case, the right-hand side of (3) gives user i's equilibrium cost. In the special case in which all users have the same cost function, this definition essentially reduces to (2).
The case of user-dependent cost functions differs from that of a single, common cost function in a number of ways. For example, the result that, for series-parallel networks and additively separable cost functions, equilibrium costs are unique (Proposition 7), is no longer true if heterogeneity is allowed. This is shown by the following example.
Example 1. Three types of users travel from o to d in the series-parallel network
shown in Figure 5 . Type I users are those with 0 ≤ i < 1/8, type II are those with 1/8 ≤ i < 1/4, and type III are those with 1/4 ≤ i ≤ 1. The cost functions are additively separable: for each type of user, the cost of each route is the sum of the costs of its edges. The cost of edge e j for user i depends on i's type and on the fraction x of users using edge e j , as detailed in the following (where blank cells indicate prohibitively high costs). There is one Nash equilibrium in which all type I users take the route going through e 1 and e 4 , all type II users take the route going though e 2 and e 3 , and all type III users use e 5 . In this Nash equilibrium, everyone's cost is 3/4. However, there is another Nash equilibrium, in which all users incur a higher cost, 5/6. In this Nash equilibrium, type III users with 5/6 ≤ i ≤ 1 take the route going though e 2 and e 4 , and all the other users use e 5 . Any convex 20 combination of these two equilibria (in terms of the proportion of users of each type using each route) is also a Nash equilibrium, with an intermediate equilibrium cost.
Thus, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. These equilibria can be Pareto ranked in the sense that, in each equilibrium, everyone's cost is higher, or everyone's cost is lower, than in each of the other equilibria. Indeed, the costs in each equilibrium are the same for all users. These costs are minimal at the first Nash equilibrium described above. Moreover, it can be shown that this Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient, in the obvious sense (see below). The second Nash equilibrium in Example 1 is not even weakly Pareto efficient. As in the homogeneous case (Theorem 2), this lack of efficiency may be attributed to the fact that routes in the network are not independent. As Theorem 3 below shows, in a network with independent routes Nash equilibria are always weakly Pareto efficient.
And if the cost functions of all users are increasing, then all Nash equilibria satisfy a condition stronger than Pareto efficiency, which will be referred to as hyperefficiency.
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A strategy profile σ is weakly Pareto efficient if there is no strategy profile τ such 
A strategy profile σ will be said to be hyper-efficient if, for every strategy profile τ,
In words, any effective change of route choices is harmful to some of those who change their routes. Clearly, any hyper-efficient strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, it is a strong equilibrium, and even a strictly strong equilibrium.
5
This means that deviations are never profitable, not just for individuals but also for groups of users: Any deviation that makes someone in the group better off must leave someone else worse off. In a network with independent routes, and when all cost functions are increasing, the converse is also true. That is, under these conditions any Nash equilibrium is hyper-efficient and, hence, Pareto efficient and a strictly strong equilibrium.
Theorem 3. For every network G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) For every assignment of cost functions to users, all Nash equilibria are weakly Pareto efficient.
(ii) For every assignment of increasing cost functions to users, all Nash equilibria are hyper-efficient.
(iii) G is a network with independent routes.
While independence of the routes implies that all equilibria are efficient, even this condition does not guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium costs if the population is heterogeneous. The following example shows this.
5 A strategy profile σ is a strictly strong equilibrium (Voorneveld at al., 1999) if, for every strategy
Example 2. Three types of users travel from o to d in the network shown in Figure 3 .
Type I users are those with 0 ≤ i < 4/13, type II are those with 4/13 ≤ i < 8/13, and type III are those with 8/13 ≤ i ≤ 1. The cost functions are additively separable: for each type of user, the cost of each route is the sum of the costs of its edges. The cost of edge e j for user i depends on i's type and on the fraction x of users using edge e j , as detailed in the following A yet unresolved problem is the determination of necessary and sufficient topological conditions guaranteeing that, for any assignment of increasing, additively separable cost functions to users, each user's equilibrium cost is unique. A sufficient condition for this is that the network consists of several edges connected in parallel (Milchtaich, 2000; Konishi, 2001) , o r is the result of connecting several such networks in series. However, this condition is not necessary. For sufficient conditions on the cost functions, which guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium edge flows and, hence, the equilibrium costs, see, for example, Altman and Kameda (2001) . The conditions are essentially these: Each edge can be passed through in one direction only; and its cost is equal to some increasing function of the edge flow, which is the same for all users, plus a user-specific constant, which does not depend on the flow.
APPENDIX
The Appendix contains the proofs of the various propositions and theorems in this paper.
Proof of Proposition 1. The three claims given below together prove the proposition and, in addition, establish the following result.
Lemma 1. A network is series-parallel if and only if it satisfies the following condition:
For every pair of distinct vertices u and v, if u precedes v in some route r containing both vertices, then u precedes v in all such routes.
Consequently, for every two routes r and s in a series-parallel network and every vertex v common to both routes, the walk r ov + s vd is a route (i.e., it does not pass through any vertex more than once).
CLAIM 1. Every network that satisfies the condition in Lemma 1 is series-parallel.
This is obvious. Indeed, for a network to be series-parallel it only has to satisfy the condition for all pairs of vertices u and v that are joined by some edge.
CLAIM 2. The network in Figure 1 is embedded in every network that does not satisfy the above condition.
Suppose there are two routes r and s in a network G, and two vertices u and v common to both routes, such that u precedes v in r but follows it in s. Suppose also that u and v are chosen in such a way that the length of r uv is maximal. Then, any vertex u' common to r and s that precedes u in r must precede v in s, and any vertex v' common to both routes that follows v in r must follow u in s (see Figure 6 ). 
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This relation is obviously reflexive and symmetric. It remains to be shown that it is transitive. That is, if r, s, and t are three routes such that there is some vertex u ≠ o, d
common to r and s and some vertex v ≠ o, d common to s and t, then there is also some vertex, other than o and d, common to r and t. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that u precedes v in s, and there is no other vertex in the section s uv that belongs either to r or to t (see Figure 7) . This assumption implies that the network in Figure 1 is embedded in the network that consists of all the vertices and edges in r, t, and s uv . However, by Proposition 1, this contradicts the assumption that G is series-parallel. This contradiction proves Claim 1. would belong to two routes in two different equivalence classes, which is impossible by definition of the equivalence relation.) Therefore, each edge also belongs to one, and only one, of them. This implies that G is the result of connecting G' and G" in parallel. Clearly, since G is series-parallel, the same is true for G' and G". Hence, G satisfies (ii).
In the rest of this proof, it will be assumed that the equivalence relation in Claim 1 holds between any pair of routes in G. It will be shown that there is some vertex, other than o and d, which is common to all routes. Note that the above assumption implies that each route in G has at least two edges. Indeed, since a route with a single edge is not equivalent to any other route, it must be the only route in G. The route's unique edge is then the only edge in G, a contradiction to the assumption that G has more than one edge. Suppose the contrary, that v t does not belong to some route s. Let u be the last vertex before v t in r that also belongs to s. By the way t was chosen, u ≠ o. By Lemma 1, the first vertex after u in s that also belongs to r follows v t in r. This implies that t ov t and s ud do not have a vertex in common. For if a common vertex v did exist, then the route t ov + s vd would have the property that the vertex v t ov + s vd (i.e., the first vertex after o in which the route intersects r) follows v t in r, which is a contradiction to the way t was chosen (see Figure 8) . The fact that t ov t and s ud do not have a common vertex implies that the walk t ov t + (−r) v t u + s ud is a route (i.e., it does not pass through any vertex more than once). However, this contradicts the assumption that G is series-parallel. This contradiction proves Claim 2.
It follows from Claim 2 that G is the result of connecting two series-parallel networks in series: the network G' that consists of v t (as destination) and all the vertices and edges that precede it in some route in G; and the network G" that consists 27 of v t (as the origin) and all the vertices and edges that follow it in some route in G. By Lemma 1, v t is the only vertex common to both networks. Since G' and G" are clearly
Proof of Proposition 3. Since, clearly, (iii) implies (ii) and (ii) implies (i), it suffices to
show that every series-parallel network G satisfies (iii). This will be proved by induction on the number of edges in G. If there is only one edge, (iii) holds trivially.
Suppose, then, that G has more than one edge and that (iii) holds for any seriesparallel network with a smaller number of edges than G. By Proposition 2, G is the result of connecting two series-parallel networks in series or in parallel. By the induction hypothesis, each of these two networks satisfies (iii). It will now be shown that this implies that G itself also satisfies (iii).
Condition (iii) is equivalent to the following:
There is a one-to-one function ϕ from the set of vertices to the integers such that, for every pair of vertices u and v, if u precedes v in some route r then ϕ(u) < ϕ(v).
When two networks G' and G" that satisfy (iii) are connected in series or in parallel, a function ϕ' as above exists for G', and another one ϕ" exists for G". It is, moreover, not difficult to see that these functions can be chosen in such a way that, for every vertex u in G' and every vertex v in G", ϕ'(u) = ϕ"(v) if and only if u = v. The unique common extension ϕ of ϕ' and ϕ" to the union of the two sets of vertices then satisfies the above condition for the network that is the result of connecting G' and G" in series or in parallel. Hence, that network also satisfies (iii).
n The proof of Proposition 4 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For a series-parallel network G, the following three conditions are equivalent:
One of the networks in Figure 2 is embedded in G.
(ii) There is a triplet of routes in G that constitutes a "bad configuration." (This term is defined in the paragraph that follows Proposition 5.) (iii) There is a pair of routes r and s, and a vertex v common to both routes, such that r ov ≠ s ov and r vd ≠ s vd .
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii)
. This is clear, since a bad configuration exists in both networks in Figure 2 .
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose there is a bad configuration: a route t and two edges e 1 and e 2 in this route, with e 1 preceding e 2 , such that e 2 , but not e 1 , also belongs to another route s, and e 1 , but not e 2 , also belongs to a third route r. Note that, since the network is series-parallel, r and s pass through e 1 and e 2 , respectively, in the same directions as t.
Let u be the first vertex in s that also belongs to t and, in that route, follows e 1 but precedes e 2 . Let v be the last vertex in r that also belongs to t and, in that route, follows e 1 but precedes e 2 (see Figure 9) . (iii) ⇒ (i). Let r, s, and v be as in (iii) . Let e 1 be the last edge in r that precedes v and does not belong to s, and v 1 the end vertex of e 1 which follows this edge in r. Let e 2 be the first edge in r that follows v and does not belong to s, and u 2 the end vertex of e 2 which precedes this edge in r (see Figure 10 ). Let u 1 be the last vertex before v 1 in s that also belongs to r, and v 2 the first vertex after u 2 in s that also belongs to r. Figures 1 and 2 is a network with independent routes. Therefore, the same is true for every network G in which one of these networks is embedded. Conversely, if none of these networks is embedded in G, then, by Proposition 1, G is series-parallel and, by Lemma 2, a triplet of routes constituting a bad configuration does not exist. This implies that G is a network with independent routes. For, otherwise, there would be a route r, every edge of which also belongs to some other route. Clearly, no route s ≠ r can have all of r's edges. Let s be a route with a maximal number of such edges. Let e 1 be an edge in r that is not in s, and t ≠ r a route containing e 1 . Because of the way s was chosen, there is at least one edge e 2 common to r and s that is not in t. However, this implies that r, s, and t constitute a bad configuration, which is a contradiction. n Proof of Proposition 5. One direction is obvious: If a network satisfies (i), (ii), or (iii), then it is a network with independent routes. To prove the converse, assume that G is a network with independent routes. Since this is not the case for any of the networks in Figures 1 and 2 , none of these networks is embedded in G. By Proposition 1, this implies that G is series-parallel. Also, by Lemma 2: (1) for every pair of routes r and s and every vertex v common to both routes, r ov = s ov or r vd = s vd , and (2) CLAIM 2. In the set of all routes in G, the relation "route r and route s have an edge in common" is an equivalence relation.
Proof of Proposition 4. None of the networks in
Claim 2 follows from the fact that, if route r shares an edge e 1 with route s, and s shares an edge e 2 with a third route t, then at least one of the edges e 1 and e 2 must be common to r and t, otherwise these three routes would constitute a bad configuration.
Two cases are possible: Either there are two or more equivalence classes with respect to the equivalence relation in Claim 2; or this relation holds between any pair of routes in G. In the former case, pick up one of the equivalence classes, and consider the network G' that consists of all the vertices and edges that belong to at least one route in this equivalence class, as well as the network G" that consists of all the vertices and edges that belong to at least one route not in the class. It follows from Claim 1 and the definition of the equivalence relation that each vertex, other than o and d, belongs to one, and only one, of these two networks. Therefore, each edge also belongs to one, and only one, of them. This implies that G is the result of connecting G' and G" in parallel. Since G is a network with independent routes, the same is clearly true for G' and G". Hence, G satisfies (ii).
In the rest of this proof, it will be assumed that the equivalence relation holds between any pair of routes in G; i.e., any two routes have an edge in common.
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CLAIM 3. All the routes in G have the same first edge, or they all have the same last edge.
To prove this claim, suppose there are two routes r and s that do not have the same last edge. Since, by assumption, they have some edge in common, it follows from Claim 1 that the first edge in r coincides with the first edge in s. Call this edge e. By a similar argument, every route t that does not have e as its first edge must have the same last edge as r. Similarly, it must have the same last edge as s. However, r and s do not have the same last edge. This contradiction proves that all routes must have e as their first edge, thus completing the proof of Claim 3.
It follows from Claim 3 that there is some edge e, with o or d as one of its end vertices, which belongs to all routes. This implies that e is the only edge incident with o or d, respectively. Therefore, either G has a single edge, or it is the result of connecting in series the network that consists of e and its two end vertices and the network that consists of all the other vertices and edges in G plus the end vertex of e which is not o or d. Clearly, the latter is a network with independent routes. Hence, G
satisfies (i) or (iii).
n Proof of Proposition 6. For each of the networks in Figures 1 and 2 , none of the four conditions holds. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 4 that (i), (ii), and (iii) do not hold for any network G which is not a network with independent routes. Conversely, if G is a network with independent routes, then (i) clearly holds. And since G is series-parallel and none of the networks in Figure 2 is embedded in it, (ii) and (iii) hold by Lemma 2. n The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Proposition 7. Figure 1 is embedded in it. As shown, in that particular network Braess's paradox does occur. The same is true for any network in which it is embedded. This can easily be seen by considering the following rules for assigning costs to the new edges created by the three operations defining embedding: For each of the two edges created when an existing edge is subdivided, the cost is one half that of the original edge; for an edge joining two existing vertices, the cost is infinite (or, at least, very high); and for the edge created when the origin or the destination are "extended," the cost is an arbitrary increasing function of the edge flow. n
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 2. = 0. The only routes r such that f ˆr > f ˜r are r 3 and r 4 . However, r 3 includes e 1 , and r 4 includes e 3 , and for these two edges, the edge flow in f ˆ is less than in f ˜. In view of Propositions 1 and 4, this example proves that for any seriesparallel network in which routes are not independent there is a pair of distinct flow vectors f ˆ and f ˜ for which a route r as above does not exist.
The converse, that for every network G with independent routes, a route r as above exists for every pair of distinct flow vectors with equal total origin-destination flows, will be proved by induction on the number of edges. The induction hypothesis is that this is true for any network with independent routes and a smaller number of edges than G. Let f ˆ and f ˜ be two distinct flow vectors in G with equal total origindestination flows. Since the flow vectors themselves are distinct, G must have at least two edges. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 5 that G is the result of connecting two series-parallel networks, G' and G", in series or in parallel. In the former case, one of these, say G", has only one edge, e. Then, by similar arguments to those used in the proof of Lemma 3, the induction hypothesis implies that there is some route r'
in G' such that f ˆs ≥ f ˜s for all sections s of r', and f ˆr ' ≥ f ˜r ' . The route r in G obtained by appending e and d to r' has the same property. This is because every section s of r is (1) a section of r', or (2) the zero-length walk consisting of d alone, or (3) the result of appending e and d to some section t of r'-in which case the flows through t and s are always equal. This completes the proof for the case in which G is the result of connecting G' and G" in series. If G is the result of connecting the two networks in parallel, then, again by similar arguments to those used in the proof of Lemma 3, it follows from the induction hypothesis that there is a route r in G' or in G" such that f ˆs ≥ f ˜s for all sections s of r, and f ˆr ≥ f ˜r . Since r is also a route in G, this completes the proof. Suppose now that routes in G are not independent. By Proposition 4, one of the networks in Figures 1 and 2 is embedded in G. As shown, for each of these three networks there is an increasing, additively separable cost function and a corresponding equilibrium that is not even weakly Pareto efficient. The same is true for every network in which one of these networks is embedded; the proof of this is based on the same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose now that routes in G are not independent. There are increasing, additively separable cost functions for G and a corresponding Nash equilibrium that is not even weakly Pareto efficient. The proof of this is the same as the one given for Theorem 2. n
